Consistency of the Presidential System in Indonesia by Kuswanto, Kuswanto
Consistency of the Presidential System in Indonesia 
[170] Sriwijaya Law Review  Vol. 2 Issue 2, July (2018) 
 
Editorial Office: Faculty of Law, Sriwijaya UniversityJalan Srijaya Negara, Palembang, South 
Sumatra 30139, Indonesia. 
Phone: +62711-580063Fax: +62711-581179 
E-mail: sriwijayalawreview@unsri.ac.id| sriwijayalawreview@gmail.com 
Website: http://journal.fh.unsri.ac.id/index.php/sriwijayalawreview 
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Abstract: The current presidential system in Indonesia is the result of the amendments of the 1945 
Constitution. Prior to Indonesian reform, the presidential system was influenced by a strong parlia-
mentary pattern in which the president was responsible for the People's Consultative Assembly. 
Today, this provision is no longer exist. However, consistency of the presidential system is still 
problematic because the the dominance power of the president over the House of Representatives. 
These problematic points are not in line with presidential system principle because it reduce the au-
thority of president. The Parliament may only establish any law as long as it is pursuant to the 1945 
Constitution. This article aims to examine the issue of the Indonesian presidential system at least in 
two following sections. Firstly, it deals with dominance of presidential power over the House of Rep-
resentatives. Secondly, president establishes the independent bodies such as Corruption Eraditation 
Commission (KPK) and National Commission of Human Rights (Komnas HAM) which are constitu-
tionally less restricted.  
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INTRODUCTION 
The process of constitutional reform in In-
donesia in 1999-2002 was a very interesting 
political event and legal event. This process 
was preceded by a process of political re-
form in 1998. The target in the constitu-
tional reform was to make a significant 
change to the Indonesian constitution, 
namely the 1945 Constitution (the 1945 
Constitution). In 1999 general election, po-
litical agreement among the political elites 
on a number of major issues impacted to 
the amendement of the 1945 Constitution 
including presidential system, affirmation 
of human rights protection commitment, 
and checks and balances. 
The main issue of this paper is the in-
stitutionalization of presidential powers in 
Indonesia in relation to legislative powers 
based on the presidential system in the 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution. This 
study is of great interest both in the Com-
parative Constitutional Law (Comparative 
Constitutional Law) and comparative stud-
ies of Political Science Comparative Poli-
tics). Constitutional change as a political 
process is very difficult to produce a prod-
uct of legal decision consistent with the 
principle or principle of law (legal princi-
ple) which is ideal. Such products are often 
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pragmatic and compromise, regardless of 
principle or principle. Related to that this 
paper would be more specific to criticize 
the product of the process of constitutional 
change in the consistency of presidential 
system points formulated in the amendment 
of the 1945 Constitution with the principle 
or principle of the presidential system itself. 
As preliminary information, regulatory 
changes concerning the issue of the rela-
tionship between the presidency and the 
legislative powers whose designs are based 
on the presidential system have been of par-
ticular concern since the People's Consulta-
tive Assembly (MPR), the holder of power 
constituting the constituent power, Presi-
dential system purification. However, the 
policy cannot be fully implemented into the 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution. 
Therefore, the 1945 Constitution on the 
outcome of change, especially as it con-
cerns the presidential system, is incapable 
of being consistent with the principle or 
principle of the presidential system itself 
with the incentive to continue the practice 
of the parliamentary system. On the condi-
tion, this paper would recommend thinking 
for a change back to the idea of an early 
change of the 1945 Constitution by imple-
menting consistently the principle or prin-
ciple of the presidential system itself.  
Correspondingly, the systematics of 
this paper can be explained as follows. 
First, the author will explain the essential 
conception of the presidential system. That 
conception is here referred to as the princi-
ple or principle of the presidential system. 
Secondly, the author will explain the pro-
cess and product of the amendment of the 
1945 Constitution concerning the Indone-
sian presidential system. This discussion 
will show the crucial points of the outcome 
of the change that clearly reflect the incon-
sistencies of the presidential system. Third, 
the authors will convey the points of 
thought in order to correct the weakness or 
lack of arrangement into the constitution 
concerning the arrangement in the relation-
ship between the presidency and the legisla-
tive power based on the presidential system. 
This thinking is expected to contribute to 
the process of constitutional reform in the 
future, especially for the fifth amendment 
of the 1945 Constitution. 
 
ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION 
Presidentialism as a Constitutional Prin-
ciple 
Functionally, the presidential system, or 
presidential, is the legal framework with 
respect to the regime types or forms of gov-
ernment of a state, as well as the parliamen-
tary system, which forms the basis for set-
ting the pattern of relations between the leg-
islature and the executive of a country.
1
 
Conceptually, the presidential system as a 
constitutional concept has the same general 
features or features, although the state that 
applies it to the constitution can provide a 
particular feature that distinguishes it from 
one another as a presidential state.
2
 The 
general conception of the presidential sys-
tem, as well as its underlying ideal, is quali-
fied here as a constitutional principle. Pres-
identialism as a constitutional principle will 
be the standard in evaluating the consisten-
cy of presidential systems in Indonesia. 
                                                          
1
 Matthew S. Shugart, Comparative 
Executive Legislative Relations, in R.A.W. 
Rhodes et.al.,      eds., The Oxford Handbook of 
Political      Institutions, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press,      2006, p344. 
2
  Scott Mainwaring & Matthew S. Shugart, 1997, 
“Juan Linz, Presidential, and Democracy,” 
Comparative Politics, 29 (4), pp463-468. 
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Before discussing the principle of the 
presidential system, it will be explained the 
concept of the presidential system. Accord-
ing to Shugart, the presidential system has 
three general characteristics: "(1) the execu-
tive is headed by a popularly elected presi-
dent who serves as the chief executive; (2) 
the terms of the chief executive and the leg-
islative assembly are fixed, and not subject 
to mutual confidence; (3) the president's 
names and directs the cabinet and has some 
constitutionally granted law-making author-
ity.
3
 "In his further explanation, Shugart 
states: 
Owing to their separate origins in the 
electorate and their fixed terms (separate 
survival), there is no formal hierarchy be-
tween legislative and executive authority. 
Inter-branch transactions are so important 
that they may be related to the passage of 
legislation that may be sought by their re-
spective electorates.
4
  
In other words, Cheibub explains the 
core of the presidential system is that the 
executive and the legislature are independ-
ent inter alia.”5 Thus, government or 
executive does not require any legislative 
support to exist.”6 
Conceptually, the presidential system 
can be better understood by starting from 
the opposite concept, the parliamentary sys-
tem. This system, according to Shugart, is 
different from the presidential system with 
regard to two aspects, namely "the origin 
and survival of executive and legislative 
authority." Shugart explains it as follows: 
                                                          
3
  Matthew S. Shugart, Note 1, p349. 
4
  Note 3, p354. 
5
 Jose Antonio Cheibub, Presidentialism, 
Parliamentarism and Democracy, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007, p1. 
6
   Note 5, p26. 
In a parliamentary system, executive authori-
ty originates from the assembly. The precise 
institutional rules for determining who shall 
form a cabinet vary across parliamentary sys-
tems, but in all of them, the process of form-
ing a government falls to the majority party if 
there is one. If there is not, the government 
emerges from bargaining among those politi-
cians who received their mandate at the most 
recent assembly elections. Once formed, the 
government survives in office only so long as 
it maintains the „confidence‟ of the majority 
in the assembly. Again, the precise rules for 
determining when a government has lost this 
confidence vary, but always the executive is 
subject to the ongoing confidence of parlia-
ment.
7
 
Different principles apply and at the 
same time their implications, in presidential 
systems. Cheibub & Limongi explains: 
The fact that the head of the government's 
mandate originates in popular elections leads 
to a totally different world where coalitions 
and government duration are irrelevant. The 
president and the legislature have a fixed 
term in office and government duration, 
therefore, becomes a moot question. The fact 
that the president does not need to generate 
majority support in the legislature in order to 
remain in office, in turn, makes coalition 
governments unnecessary.
8
  
Based on the above explanation can be 
obtained a general sense of the presidential 
system with regard to how the power of the 
president obtained and how the process of 
formation of government can be run by the 
system. 
The emphasis above is that the position 
of the president authorized for his authority 
from the direct people, without going 
through parliament, and his relationship 
with the independent legislature is granted a 
permanent guarantee of tenure (fixed term) 
with more elegant sentence. In this stage, 
                                                          
7
   Matthew S. Shugart, Note 1, p349. 
8
  Jose Antonio Cheibub and Fernando Limongi, 
 2011, “Legislative-Executive Relations,” in 
Tom   Ginsburg & Rosalind Dixon, Comparative 
 Constitutional Law, Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 
 p214. 
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Linz proposes an interesting discernment of 
the difference between presidential and par-
liamentary systems by looking at which po-
sition is the most dominant part of each sys-
tem. Linz's argue that: 
A parliamentary regime in the strict sense is 
one in which the only democratically legiti-
mate institution is parliament; in such a re-
gime, the government's authority is complete-
ly dependent upon parliamentary confi-
dence.” While on the presidential system 
Linz states: “In presidential systems, an ex-
ecutive with considerable constitutional pow-
ers – generally including full control of the 
composition of the cabinet and administration 
– is directly elected by the people for a fixed 
term and is independent of parliamentary 
votes of confidence.
9
  
The above opinion is essentially still 
concerned with the general features or fea-
tures of the presidential system and has not 
touched (the nature) of the presidential sys-
tem, including the ideas underlying it inher-
ently in the essence. Unlike a parliamentary 
system that prioritizes or prioritizes legisla-
tive support to a governing executive, a 
presidential system that requires the presi-
dent as chief executive to be directly elect-
ed by the people must have a specific, spe-
cific meaning. If the previous explanation 
emphasizes both the legislative and execu-
tive aspects of independence, reinforced by 
their respective fixed term, the author sees 
that there is still a substantial aspect to un-
derstand the meaning of the presidential 
system. It ultimately provides an explana-
tion of the principle or principle of, or with-
in, the presidential system itself. 
Unlike the parliamentary system, the 
president is in a presidential system, as an 
executive, independent. The President has 
an equal position with the legislative body 
that obtains a direct mandate from the peo-
                                                          
9
  Juan J. Linz, 1990, “The Perils of Presidential's,” 
Journal of Democracy, 1 (1), p52. 
ple. This conditioning effort must have a 
specific meaning, in this case, the idea of a 
presidential system. In addition to its presi-
dential factor, the executive power itself is 
essentially more privileged than the legisla-
tive power. 
Executives have the more acting ability 
when compared to legislative (and judicial) 
based on their respective functional charac-
teristics.
10
The superiority of the executive 
when compared to other governing bodies 
concerning its function is:  
Not only is the executive the authority most 
directly responsible for enforcing the law and 
maintaining order in ordinary circumstances, 
it is also the authority most immediately re-
sponsible for restoring order in extraordinary 
circumstances.
11
  
The executive power is, in essence, 
equipped with a variety of supporting tools 
that enable it to respond to any situations 
both normal and abnormal or emergency. 
Fatovic stated:  
Executives possess special resources and 
characteristics that enable them to formulate 
responses more rapidly, flexible, and deci-
sively than can legislatures, courts, and bu-
reaucracies.
12
 
Furthermore, as the name implies, ex-
ecutives have a great responsibility
13
 in the 
administration of the country because to 
                                                          
10
  Eric A. Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Terror in 
Balance: Security, Liberty and the Courts, 
Oxford:    Oxford University Press, 2007, pp3-6. 
11
  Clement Fatovic, Outside the Law: Emergency 
and Executive Power, Baltimore: The John 
Hopkins University Press, 2009, p2. 
12
  Note 11. 
13
 Responsibility arises when legal obligation is 
exist. Nurhidayatuloh, et. al., 2018, “Forsaking 
Equality: Examine Indonesia‟s State Responsi-
bility on Polygamy to the Marriage Rights in 
CEDAW,” Jurnal Dinamika Hukum, 18 (2), 
p182-193. 
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perform laws are more important than to 
cerate them.”14  
The presidential system basically wants 
the president not to rely on the support of 
the legislature in governing. This under-
standing reinforces the executive positions 
that are essential, institutionally, more 
comparative advantage than other govern-
mental bodies. In this case, the view of 
Thomas Jefferson, the third president of the 
United States, as a practitioner of the presi-
dential presidency by the presidential sys-
tem, is worth listening to. According to Jef-
ferson:  
The president unifies the will of the nation 
and thereby embodies it. The source of the 
president‟s claim to embody the will of the 
nation is his mode of election; because the 
president is the single nationally elected of-
ficer, the president can claim, more than 
members of Congress, to represent the na-
tional will. Because the president must be 
able to execute that will, it must be surpris-
ingly strong, or energetic.
15
 
In a presidential system, the capacity of 
the president to governor run the govern-
ment is the most important issue. Independ-
ence of the legislature is the starting point. 
However, to be discussed here, the notion 
of implication is wider. The presidential 
system has an internal logic that the presi-
dent is a strong and stable executive power 
holder. This strong and stable power does 
not imply that the president holds absolute 
power. But the notion is that all executive 
power is centred on the president, and does 
not require the consent of the legislature 
because it comes directly from the people. 
This is in line with Alexander Hamilton's 
opinion, related to the reason why the pres-
                                                          
14
  Jeremy D. Bailey, Thomas Jefferson and 
Executive Power, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007, pp1-27. 
15
  Note 13, pp9-10. 
ident should be elected directly by the peo-
ple and must be one person rather than 
many people, namely to ensure the execu-
tive could act with vigorous decision.
16
  
This understanding is conceived as the 
principle of the presidential system. In or-
der to constitutionalize the system to be 
more consistent, the benchmark is the prin-
ciple of the presidential system as stated 
above: the strong and stable executive pow-
er of the president in which all the execu-
tive powers are under the effective control 
of the president himself because of his de-
pendence on the legislature. This is the 
problem faced by the Indonesian presiden-
tial system, the ability to elaborate the prin-
ciple precisely into the constitution. 
The Inconsistency of Presidency Purifi-
cation Efforts in Indonesia  
The arrangement of a presidential system in 
Indonesia is one of the agenda in the 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution. The 
amendment to the 1945 Constitution is 
done in stages, namely: First Amendment to 
the 1999 People‟s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR) General Session; Second Amend-
ment to the 2000 MPR Annual Session; 
Third Amendment to the 2001 MPR Annu-
al Session; And Fourth Amendment at the 
2002 MPR Annual Session. Meanwhile, in 
making the amendment are several im-
portant points as follows. First, it does not 
change the Preamble to the 1945 Constitu-
tion. Second, it retains the form of the Uni-
tary State of the Republic of Indonesia. 
Third, reinforce the presidential govern-
ment system. Fourth, the elucidation of the 
1945 Constitution is not enforced and the 
matters in the 1945 Constitution of the 1945 
                                                          
16
 John Yoo, 2009, “Unitary, Executive, or Both,” 
The University of Chicago Law Review, 76, 
pp1937-1938. 
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Constitution that is normative will be for-
mulated in the form of articles. Fifth, make 
changes by addendum. Sixth, the formula-
tion of power sharing is firmly accompa-
nied by mechanisms checks and balances.
17
 
This section will be specifically focused on 
the issue of a presidential system arrange-
ment in Indonesia in the process of amend-
ment to the 1945 Constitution. The agenda 
for strengthening the presidential system 
began to appear explicitly in the third 
amendment of the 1945 Constitu-
tion (2001). After the first and second 
changes the main agenda is strengthening 
the position of the House then in this third 
change is done repositioning of presidential 
power in the corridor of a presidential sys-
tem.
18
 Principles relevant to the affirmative 
issue of the presidential system are the di-
rect institutionalization of the presidential 
election mechanism, the confirmation of the 
reasons for the termination of the president 
from his tenure and the assertion that the 
president should not dissolve the House of 
Representatives (DPR).
19
  
The 1945 Constitution before the 
change cannot be understood as a pure pres-
idential system because the president is not 
directly elected by the people and may be 
dismissed at any time by a vote in the MPR. 
                                                          
17
  Sekretariat Jenderal & Kepaniteraan Mahkamah 
Konstitusi, Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan 
Undang-undang Dasar Negara Republik 
Indonesia Tahun 1945, Latar Belakang, Proses 
 dan Hasil Pembahasan 1999-2002, Buku I Latar 
 Belakang, Proses dan Hasil Perubahan UUD 
1945, Jakarta: Mahkamah Konstitusi RI, 2010, 
pp954-955. 
18
  Denny Indrayana, Amandemen UUD 1945: 
Antara Mitos dan Pembongkaran, translated 
from     Indonesian Constitutional Reform 1999-
2002: An     Evaluation of Constitution-Making 
in Transition,     Bandung: Mizan, Bandung, 
2007, pp195-199 &     240-241. 
19
  Note 17, pp275-276. 
Such an arrangement is more favourable to 
the parliamentary system, which requires 
(the chief of the executive) to the parlia-
ment. This is in contrast to the mission 
statement of the 1945 Constitution before a 
change that seems to institutionalize a pres-
idential system.
20
 
Two of the most prominent aspects re-
lated to the consistency of the Indonesian 
presidential system are the legislative posi-
tion in relation to the executive in which the 
legislature is expressly stated to have rights 
that are conceptually more skewed with a 
parliamentary system. These parliamentary 
rights are stated explicitly in Article 20A 
Paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution re-
sulting from the second amendment. The 
aforementioned provision states: "In per-
forming its functions, other than the rights 
provided for in other articles of this Consti-
tution, the People's Legislative Assembly 
shall have the right of interpellation, the 
right of inquiry and right of opinion." 
The above provisions clearly indicate 
the internal inconsistency of the presidential 
system of the 1945 Constitution itself. The 
rights of the People's Legislative Assembly 
as mentioned above are losing their rele-
vance if it is related to the principle of the 
presidential system that "the executive and 
the legislature are independent of one an-
other." Furthermore, the provision may un-
dermine the government's performance un-
der the president. The third amendment 
asure that president can only be dismissed 
by juridical reason and political reason has 
no longer affecting the decision. Article 7A 
of the 1945 Constitution determines: 
The President and/or Vice President may be 
dismissed in his term of office by the Peo-
ple's Consultative Assembly on the recom-
                                                          
20
  Note 17, p374. 
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mendation of the People's Legislative As-
sembly, if proven to have committed a vio-
lation of the law in the form of treason, cor-
ruption, bribery, other serious crimes or 
disgraceful acts or if proven no longer 
Qualify as President and/or Vice Presi-
dent.
21
 
To implement such provision, the role 
of the Constitutional Court is required to 
provide a decision, not a decision based on 
the opinion of the DPR c.q. MPR itself. The 
regulation on this matter is formulated in 
detail in Article 7B of the 1945 Constitu-
tion, the result of the third amendment. 
In political practice, the existence of 
the provision of Article 20A Paragraph (2) 
of the 1945 Constitution serves to be an in-
centive in encouraging DPR's behaviour 
towards a parliamentary style rather than 
how it should behave according to the cur-
rent presidential style. This phenomenon of 
political practice is very contrary to the un-
derlying principle of the presidential system 
itself. In turn, it has the effect of weakening 
the performance of the government (presi-
dent) because it has to respond to the par-
liamentarian attitude of the DPR. Such an 
experience occurred during the first admin-
istration of President Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (2004-2009) who had to face 
the disruption of the DPR for reasons of 
strengthening the bargaining position, ra-
ther than the substantial reasons, for things 
that were essentially in the domain of exec-
utive policy exclusively.
22
 
The above case can happen is actually 
more due to a political error made by Presi-
dent Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). 
                                                          
21
 Republic of Indonesia, Undang-undang 
DasarNegara Republik Indonesia 1945, Article 
7A 
22
  Hanta Yuda AR, Presidensialisme Setengah 
Hati:     Dari Dilemma ke Kompromi, Jakarta: 
Gramedia     Pustaka Utama, 2010, p185-191. 
As president of the presidential system, 
SBY is very wrong when starting his gov-
ernment by opening parliamentary behav-
iour initiatives through the formation of 
multi-party coalitions within the govern-
ment and in the DPR. As elected president, 
SBY failed to gain majority support in par-
liament. To overcome the strategic obsta-
cles in the government, SBY invites politi-
cal parties to join the government in the 
hope that once the political parties join, 
their representatives in the DPR will fully 
support the president's policy.
23
 Should, in 
line with the spirit of the presidential sys-
tem, it is not necessary to do by the elected 
president as above has been affirmed by 
Cheibub & Limongi. The political stances 
taken by President SBY delegitimize presi-
dential powers based on the presidential 
system.  
The principle of the presidency, in 
essence, contains protection against the 
presidency and the president in running the 
government. It appears implicitly that the 
president cannot be politically disturbed by 
the House. Through a different, but very 
straightforward phrase, it says: “under pres-
identialism, the government cannot be re-
placed even if a majority of the legislature 
so wishes.”24 Here, in fact, whoever his 
president, in the presidential system, he 
must have the courage to rule, even if only 
gained minority support in parliament. 
The role of the President that no longer 
dominating the governmental powers, the 
strengthened role of the DPR, and the 
lowering position of the MPR that no 
                                                          
23
  Note 2, pp135-141 & 170-181. 
24
  Jose A. Cheibub, Adam Przeworski & Sebastian 
M. Saiegh, 2004, “Government Coalitions and 
Legislative Success Under Presidentialism and 
Parliamentarism, British Journal of Political 
Science, 34, p566. 
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longer as the highest state institution – 
reflecting the paradigm shift in 
administering the state.
25
 
 The President in running the govern-
ment cannot be blamed by the House of 
Representatives unless the president vio-
lates the law as intended by Article 7A of 
the 1945 Constitution. Thus, as a negative 
parable, even the sleeping president, 
throughout his tenure, he cannot be dis-
missed by the Parliament. However, the ex-
istence of parliamentary political rights of 
the House has the potential to cause politi-
cal disruption to the president as the facts of 
politics are proven to support such juridical 
assumptions. 
A strong presidential character based 
on a presidential system is evident from 
President Barack Obama's attitude in re-
sponse to his minority position in the Re-
publican-controlled House of Representa-
tives. The condition is feared will hinder 
the running of government policies in the 
social and economic field. Without a hint of 
a bit Obama gave his statement his attitude 
as follows: 
We are not just going to be waiting for legis-
lation in order to make sure that we‟re 
providing Americans the kind of help that 
they need. I‟ve got a pen, and I‟ve got a 
phone. And I can use that pen to sign execu-
tive orders and take executive actions and 
administrative actions that move the ball for-
ward… I‟ve got a phone that allows me to 
convene Americans from every walk of life 
to try to bring more and more Americans to-
gether around what I think is a unifying 
theme: making sure that this is a country 
where, if you work hard, you can make it.
26
 
                                                          
25
  Zen Zanibar, 2018, ”The Indonesian 
Constitutional System In the Post Amendement 
of The 1945 Constitutions”, Sriwijaya Law 
Review, 2 (1), p45-55 
26
  Tara Helfman, 2015, “Book Review: Crown and 
Constitution,” Harvard Law Review, 128(8), 
2015, p2234. 
The above statement is not a form of 
arrogance, but the reasonable attitude of a 
president whose system of government is 
based on a presidential system. When faced 
with institutional barriers of minority sup-
port in parliament, presidents in presidential 
systems are still allowed to move on the 
basis of their discretion. That is the ad-
vantage of the government in a presidential 
system in which the head of his government 
does not need to rely on parliamentary ap-
proval. 
Moreover, the existence of new gov-
ernment agencies (state auxiliary agencies) 
that are functionally executive, but whose 
position is independent of the president. 
Note that not all new independent govern-
ing bodies are problematic in relation to the 
consistency of the presidential system prin-
ciple. The examples of the Judicial Com-
mission which are in the realm of judicial 
affairs. Judging from the principle of the 
presidential system, bodies such as the Ju-
dicial Commission are not a problem be-
cause they do not lie in the realm of execu-
tive power. In another sense, the more spe-
cific question here is the new independent 
governing body but functionally within the 
realm of executive power. 
After the political reform of 1998, there 
was a great tendency in the process of limit-
ing power, especially the president (execu-
tive). One of the techniques employed in 
the dissolution of executive power, so that 
power is more divided among many, 
through the legislation that forms a new 
governmental body. Some of these new 
governing bodies are, to name some of the 
most famous examples, National Commis-
sion of Human Rights (Komnas HAM) and 
Corruption Eradication Commission 
(KPK). At first glance, this effort seems 
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good. However, when drawn a straight line 
with the principle of presidential, this effort 
is inconsistent. 
The acceptance of these efforts is based 
on the notion that the executive concept is 
rich in functions, but structurally, the Indo-
nesian constitutional system is too poor for 
institutions to rely solely on the 1945 Con-
stitution itself. The government bodies that 
are constituted by the 1945 Constitution are 
still very limited to implement a broader 
constitutional scheme in bringing the coun-
try to its goal. These bodies are People 
Consultative Assembly, House of 
Representative, Regional Representative 
Council, President, Supreme Court, 
Constitutionl Court, Judicial Commissions, 
Audit Board of the Republic of Indonesia 
and Central Bank.
27
 
The issue here is not solely about the 
use of legislative power and the dispersion 
of executive power with the creation of new 
independent governing bodies. The Parlia-
ment may establish any law as long as it is 
not contrary to the Constitution, including 
establishing a new governmental body 
along the corridors of governmental power 
based on the Constitution. The dissolution 
of the executive power, by the idea of being 
linked to the limitation of power, is a good 
idea but it is not always constitutional if it 
is done by ignoring the constitution, the 
constitutional principle itself as the princi-
ple of presidential. At this point, the theo-
retical analysis proposed by Zainal Arifin 
Mochtar is less precise when looking at this 
phenomenon solely from the issue of limi-
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dan Urgensi Penataannya Kembali Pasca-
Amandemen Konstitusi, Jakarta: RajaGrafindo 
Persada, pp129-131. 
tation of power alone, but ignores the very 
nature of the system of government adopted 
in the constitution, in this case, the presi-
dential system. 
As explained above, the existence of 
new governmental bodies in the executive 
and independent realms should not be sepa-
rated from the context of the applicability 
of the presidential system, unless the prin-
ciple of this form of government is regarded 
as irrelevant or has no constitutional mean-
ing. The principle is that independent gov-
ernment bodies in the executive environ-
ment reduce the power of government in 
the hands of the president based on the 
presidential system. For example, the au-
thority to eradicate corruption by KPK is 
still the realm of execution of laws that 
should be under the control of the president, 
so in the conventional mechanism, it is in 
the hands of the prosecutor's office. As the 
authority to eradicate corruption turns to the 
independent KPK, the president as the 
holder and administrator of the highest ad-
ministrative power, as chief executive, no 
longer has that responsibility, including the 
control to oversee the real people who are 
still in the executive. Therefore, the presi-
dent cannot be held accountable for the 
eradication of corruption that is still within 
the realm of execution of the law (execu-
tive), so it must be accounted for by the in-
dependent KPK. At this point, it can be 
concluded that the existence of government 
bodies such as the KPK and Komnas HAM 
are contrary to the principle of presidential 
system.
28
 
The basis of the analysis to support the 
above argument is the constitutional theory 
that developed widely among American 
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constitutional scholars known as the con-
cept of the unitary executive. This article 
shows that the concept of the unitary execu-
tive is most appropriate to interprate the 
concept of executive power on presidential 
system. Ginsburg & Menashi explains the 
concept of the unitary executive:  
...has nothing to do with the extent of presi-
dential power but only with who is to exer-
cise those powers, however broad, allocated 
to the executive. Its proponents seek not to 
evade the limitations of separated powers, but 
rather insist – especially when dealing with 
the other branches – that the President alone 
is responsible for the actions of the executive 
branch.
29
 
Based on the theory, concept of unitary 
executive constitution should: 
...empower the President to control the execu-
tion of federal law. This generic assertion has 
as many as three sub-claims: that the Presi-
dent, as the „constitutional executor‟ of the 
laws, personally may execute any federal law 
himself; that the President, as Chief Execu-
tive, may direct all executive officers in their 
execution of federal law; and that the Presi-
dent, as the Supreme Executive Magistrate 
charged with ensuring faithful law execution, 
may remove executive officers.
30
 
The above view is a statement about 
the constitutional theory of the Constitution 
of the United States on the executive power 
of the president based on the presidential 
system. Based on this conception, if the 
1945 Constitution is rightly a presidential 
constitution, then the theoretical under-
standing as stated also applies mutatis mu-
tandis. It can, therefore, be concluded if 
projected according to the concept of a uni-
tary executive, the dissolution of executive 
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of Constitutional Law, 12 (2), p252. 
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  Saikrishna B. Prakash, 2009, “Fragmented 
Features of the Constitution‟s Unitary 
Executive,”     Willamette Law Review, 45, p701. 
power through the establishment of inde-
pendent governing bodies in the realm of 
executive power is very much against the 
principle of the presidency because it im-
plies reducing the capacity of the president 
as the holder of executive power.  
In the end, it can be concluded that a 
system with its opposite components is not 
good.
31
 This happens to the 1945 Constitu-
tion. A system, including a system of gov-
ernment, should be consistent with the prin-
ciple of non-contradiction, at least as a form 
of adherence to the simplest laws of logic. 
These two conditions of inconsistency or 
contradiction, if not addressed immediately, 
could have an impact on the power of the 
president from the perspective of the presi-
dential system. This is not a problem if the 
system of government is a parliamentary 
system. 
Reorganization of the Indonesian Presi-
dential System  
The amendment of the 1945 Constitution 
was made by politicians with a very limited 
level of legal knowledge, and with a very 
high political desire to take advantage of 
the moment as capital to gain an opportuni-
ty to gain political power. With the presi-
dential system, implicitly, politicians expe-
rience fear if their political role becomes 
diminished, especially the political role in 
parliament (DPR). The choice of a presi-
dential system clearly creates a dilemma for 
their narrow political interests. This choice 
poses a risk to their political career because, 
as a constitutional implication, the presi-
dent's leadership will be pushing around so 
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that it will be very difficult for them to bal-
ance. Political aspirations of politicians are 
actually more suited to the parliamentary 
system than the presidential system. 
With overwhelming political aspira-
tions, containers such as presidential sys-
tems are too narrow for them. To play a 
significant political role, the parliamentary 
system is very accommodating to the aspi-
rations of politicians because it prefers ne-
gotiations or close ties between legislative-
executives in which executives form and 
run governments with the confidence of 
parliament. While the presidential system is 
more of a zero-sum game or the winner 
takes all.
32
 More substantially, in the presi-
dential system, the chances for the president 
to continue his tenure are open. Demonstra-
tively Samuels & Shugart stated: "In the 
capital of presidential system the executive 
has far more incentives and opportunities to 
'go it alone' and violate his/her party's man-
date."
33
 This is a concern. Politicians need 
executive dependence on them, not vice 
versa as initiated by presidential systems. In 
these situations, the role of politicians is 
diminished, so they need the media to exist 
within the presidential system, one of them 
by causing political disturbance to the gov-
ernment (president). 
The Indonesian presidential system still 
requires reorganization, in particular, to be 
more consistent with the conception of a 
true presidential system. The political pres-
idential system will work properly if legis-
lative power is not too strong, political par-
ties are disciplined and systems in political 
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Journal of Theoretical Politics, 15 (1), pp39-40. 
party are not highly fragmented.” 34 The 
empirical condition does not occur in Indo-
nesia. Hypothetically, the constitutionality 
of the presidential system in Indonesia con-
tributes to the lack of specific constitutional 
rules in describing the relationship between 
the executive (president) and the legislature, 
including efforts at the level of legislative 
efforts that have a significant impact on the 
weakening of power President in the execu-
tive realm. 
On that basis, the prescriptions that can 
be proposed to institutionalize the presiden-
tial system in the 1945 Constitution con-
sistently, it must include two points. First, 
responding to the parliamentary ownership 
of parliamentary political rights. Second, 
respond to the establishment of independent 
government bodies at the level of law. 
In relation to the response to the par-
liamentary political rights of Parliament, it 
is necessary to amend the 1945 Constitution 
with the focus of abolishing Article 20A 
Paragraph (2) of the 1945 Constitution. The 
provision is clearly inconsistent with Arti-
cle 7A of the 1945 Constitution so as a 
form of reinforcement of the presidential 
system, Politicization that could disrupt the 
president's performance in exercising the 
power of government needs to be eliminat-
ed. The justification for such efforts is not 
too difficult because the provision is obvi-
ously negligence from the drafters of the 
amendment of the 1945 Constitution which 
is still carried or influenced by the nature of 
parliamentary thinking. This very critical 
issue seems to have escaped the attention of 
Denny Indrayana.
35
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A rather difficult issue is to provide 
prescriptions to limit, even exclude, the es-
tablishment of independent governing bod-
ies, including those already existing. Some 
of these agencies have very good perfor-
mance, such as the KPK. As a result, be-
cause of its good performance, the principle 
thing becomes neglected. Such pragmatic 
approaches should not be maintained, espe-
cially in the process of maturation into a 
more established constitutional system. 
What is meant here is that all constitutional 
decisions must be made on the basis of con-
stitutional principles, not on the basis of 
factual considerations such as distrust of 
existing government agencies. This process 
is not easy because indeed, specifically for 
the KPK, all already fascinated by the ef-
fectiveness of the work of the KPK. How-
ever, this should not be allowed to remain 
permanent because it shows the abnormali-
ty of the constitutional system, i.e. tolerat-
ing internal inconsistencies. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The drafters of the amendment of the 1945 
Constitution ignore the loophole in the in-
stitutionalization of a presidential system to 
sustain the parliamentary political behav-
iour. In order to maintain the role of politi-
cal behaviour, the 1945 Constitution 
amendement should be transparent in order 
to achieve the real presidential system.  
Futhermore, the semi-presidential sys-
tem is one of the options for acomotdating 
the presidential system and the parliamen-
tary system. The semi-presidential system 
is in line with the new principle of separa-
tion of powers.  
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